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Civil Rights-Standing to Sue Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
In TraHicante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' the first case
to construe standing under the enforcement sections of Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,2 the Supreme Court continued its recent trend
of liberalizing the standing-to-sue doctrine by extending to a wide
range of civil plaintiffs the right to challenge violations of the fair
housing law.' Paul Trafficante, a white man, and Dorothy Carr, a
black woman, were both tenants in a large San Francisco apartment
complex. Neither alleged that they were the primary victims of dis-
criminatory practices; instead, they claimed that their landlords, by
various means,4 had restricted the number of black tenants in the com-
plex to less than one percent of the total number of tenants' in violation
of section 804 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.0 As a result, peti-
tioners Trafficante and Carr claimed to have felt the secondary effects
of discrimination in the form of lost social, business, and professional
relationships accruing from an integrated community and in the social
stigma and economic damage occasioned by being forced to live in a
"white ghetto."' 7
1. 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801-31, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
3. A number of authors have examined this trend. E.g., Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. RFv. 450 (1970); Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the
Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911 (1972); Comment, Standing of Private
Parties to Vindicate the Public Interest, 50 B.U.L. REv. 417 (1970); Comment, The
Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing Barrier, 41
U. CoLo. L. REv. 96 (1969).
4. Petitioners alleged, inter alia, that their landlord was "making it known to
them [the non-white rental applicants] that they would not be welcome at Parkmerced,
manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their applications,
using discriminatory acceptance standards, and the like." 93 S. Ct. at 366.
5. Id. at n.5.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), which provides
in relevant part:
[l]t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling. . . because of race, color, religion,
or national origin.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling in fact is so available.
7. 93 S. Ct. at 366.
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Pursuant to section 810 of the Civil Rights Act,' petitioners filed
complaints with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HU) alleging discrimination. After failing to obtain satisfaction
from their landlords through the efforts of HUD, petitioners then filed
their complaints in the district court, which found that they were not
"persons aggrieved" within the meaning of section 810(a) in that they
were not the direct victims of the alleged discrimination. 9 The court
of appeals affirmed. 10 The Supreme Court reversed, granted standing,
and remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on the mer-
its." Mr. Justice Douglas, giving the opinion of the Court,'2 held
that "[w]e can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous construc-
tion which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who
are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facili-
ties under the auspices of HUD."' 3
The Supreme Court has in the past considered problems of stand-
ing as being governed by a "rule of self-restraint," apart from the "case
or controversy" limitation in Article H of the Constitution, because
of the practical problems inherent in significantly increasing the num-
ber of persons eligible to bring controversies before the court. 4 The
traditional test for standing required a showing of direct injury to a
legal interest, "one of property, one arising out of contract, one pro-
8. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), which
provides in relevant part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter "person aggrieved")
may file a complaint with the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment].
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970), also provides for
original jurisdiction in the federal courts without regard to the amount in controversy,
but does not require the complainant to file first with HUD.
9. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The court held further that any "enforcement of the public interest in fair housing"
should be accomplished by the Attorney General under the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
§ 813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The petitioners also claimed that their rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) had been violated; this claim was rejected by the court as
being without merit. Id. at 353.
10. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. 93 S. Ct. at 368.
12. Mr. Justice White in a concurring opinion joined by two other Justices ex-
pressed his doubt that, absent the statute relied upon here, the petitioners could
otherwise present a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution. Id.
13. Id. Because standing was granted under § 810 of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of standing under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). 93 S. Ct. at 367 n.8.
14. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
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tected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers such a privilege."'15 However, in at least one area, standing
to sue under a statute, this limited view of standing has gradually
been expanded, both by the Congress in drafting legislation and by the
judiciary in applying it.
Draftsmen have increasingly made use of "persons aggrieved"
provisions, such as the one involved in Trallicante,1 as a "statutory
aid" in conferring standing."7 The Supreme Court first construed
such a statute' 8 in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,'0 in which
a radio station challenged the grant of a license by the FCC to a com-
peting station, even though "under the Communications Act economic
injury to a competitor is not a ground for refusing a broadcasting
license .. ."20 However, the Court held:
Congress had some purpose in enacting § 402(b)(2).
It may have been of [the] opinion that one likely to be financially
injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having
a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court
errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license. It is within the power of Congress to confer such stand-
ing to prosecute an appeal.
2 '
Even when Congress does not specifically provide for standing in
a statute, such standing may be inferred when the purpose of the stat-
ute is found to evidence an intent to prevent the type of injury sus-
tained by the complainant. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.22 a
public utility alleged economic injury caused by expansion of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) into its service area in violation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933.28 Even though the statute
contained no express standing provision, 4 the Court found that the
15. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) (private
power company alleged economic injury caused by TVA competition; standing de-
nied).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), quoted
note 8 supra. A similar provision was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970).
17. Comment, 50 B.U.L. RIv., .supra note 3, at 420.
18. Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
19. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The competitive interest was also protected in Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v.
FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
20. 309 U.S. at 472.
21. Id. at 477.
22. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4 (1970).
24. 390 U.S. at 7.
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Act was designed to protect private utilities from TVA competition,
and held that "when the particular statutory provision invoked does
reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured
competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision. ' 25
The Hardin test was later adopted and further refined in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,26 in which
the statute construed did include a specific grant of standing. The
petitioners, sellers of data processing services, protested an action by
the Comptroller of the Currency granting to national banks the right
to make such services available to other banks and their customers.
They claimed standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, which
grants standing to any person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute. '2 7  The Court held that a "person ag-
grieved" must meet two tests:2 the first, derived from Article 11 of
the Constitution, is "whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise";2" the
second is "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complain-
ant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."3 0
The "injury in fact" test was explained two years later in Sierra
Club v. Morton,3 1 which required "that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured. '32  The Sierra Club alleged -that the De-
partment of the Interior had violated federal laws in allowing private
use of land preserved as national forest and claimed to be a person
aggrieved under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).13 Although
25. Id. at 6.
26. 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970).
27. Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
28. Although the Data Processing decision was nowhere cited in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the two tests for standing that it established appear to be
the basis for the reasoning in Trafficante. See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
Its omission is curious in view of the Court's citation of two other cases involving
standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), and Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
29. 397 U.S. at 152.
30. Id. at 153. The "zone of interests" test was criticized in a concurring opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Brennan in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), as a
"wholly unnecessary and inappropriate second step upon the constitutional require-
ment for standing," which should affect reviewability rather than standing. Id. at 169;
see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
31. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (4-3 decision).
32. Id. at 735. Dissenting opinions urged that an exception to this general rule
be made in environmental cases. Id. at 741-60; cf. Sedler, Standing to Assert Consti-
tutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YA E L.J. 599 (1962).
33. Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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the Supreme Court recognized that the Club "is a large and long-es-
tablished organization, with an historic commitment to the cause of
protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations,"84
the Court denied standing because the Club had failed to allege any
injury to itself or its members: "[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself
to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within
the meaning of the APA."' 5
However, the Court also indicated clearly that economic injuries
of the type alleged in the competitor's suits were not the only type of
injuries to be recognized: "Aesthetic and environmental well-being,
like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of our
life in our society," and are no less[ "deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process." '86 The lower federal courts have granted
plaintiffs standing to assert a number of other noneconomic interests,
including the quality of radio and television programming" and the
treatment of persons displaced by urban renewal programs. 8 In Shan-
non v. HUD,"0 the Third Circuit acknowledged the right of residents
in a neighborhood chosen by HUD to become the site of a low-income
housing project to allege the adverse affect on "not only their invest-
ments in homes and businesses, but even the very quality of their
daily lives." 40
In Trafficante, petitioners alleged both economic and social in-
juries caused by being forced to live in a "white ghetto."'" The
Court refused to restrict the concept of "injury" to grant standing
only to those who had themselves been refused housing. Instead, it
reaffirmed the concept that the nature of the alleged injury is unim-
portant, so long as it is an injury that has in fact been sustained by
the complainant42 and that is sufficiently particular to meet the "case
or controversy" test in Article IMI of the Constitution.48
34. 405 U.S. at 739.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 734.
37. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 818.
41. 93 S. Ct. at 366.
42. Id. at 367; see text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
43. 93 S. Ct. at 368; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
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Data Processing was nowhere mentioned in Trafficante; however,
the Data Processing "zone of interests" test 4 appears to be the occasion
for a finding by the Court that the "language of the Act is broad and
inclusive?""r and that the legislative history, albeit meager, would sup-
port a grant of standing to "those who were not the direct objects of
discrimination."4" Respondents argued, however, that in granting to
the Attorney General only the authority to seek an injunction to bar
a "pattern or practice" of discrimination,47 Congress intended that only
the Attorney General should have such power, which the petitioners
were allegedly attempting to usurp. This argument was rejected upon
a finding that, as a practical matter, the Attorney General with "less
than two dozen lawyers" in the Housing Section of the Civil Rights
division, was incapable of any effective, wide-ranging enforcement.48
Private suits are therefore necessary where "the complainants act not
only on their own behalf, but also 'as private attorneys general in
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority.' ,,49
The "private attorney general" concept 0 has been utilized in sit-
uations where the government may be unwilling or, as in Trafficante,
unable effectively to enforce a large number of violations of the law.51
In Allen v. State Board of Elections52 the Court dealt with a suit by
a private citizen alleging violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.8
As in Trafficante, the Attorney General was empowered to seek an in-
junction to halt violations, 54 but the Court recognized that because of
44. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
45. 93 S. CL at 367. Precisely which language is relied upon is not known;
however, the Court is apparently referring to the "person aggrieved" provision in
§ 810, quoted note 8 supra, and to the declaration of policy in § 801, which provides:
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for
fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
46. 93 S. Ct. at 367. The legislative history of the Act does not specifically dis-
cuss standing, but does lend some support to a finding that the Act was intended to
remedy a broad range of ills resulting from discriminatory housing practices. See
Hearings on S. 1358, & S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing & Urban Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 114 CoNG.
REc. 2706 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits); 114 CoNG. REc. 3472 (1968) (remarks
of Senator Mondale); 114 CONG. REc. 9559 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Celler).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
48. 93 S. Ct. at 367.
49. Id.
50. This phrase was first used in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
51. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 939-40.
52. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973p (1970).
54. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1970).
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the large number of potential violations, "[t]he achievement of the
Act's laudable goal would be severely hampered . . .if each citizen
were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion
of the Attorney General." 55
In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.," a private citizen had
successfully obtained an injunction under Tire II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,57 which, like the statute in Trafficante, permitted the
Attorney General to initiate suits only to remedy "patterns or prac-
tices" of discrimination.58  The Court allowed full attorney's fees to
the petitioner, reasoning that to do otherwise would discourage suits
by aggrieved parties." The Court further observed:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evi-
dent that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of
securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus
private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under
that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an in-
junction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered
of the highest priority. 60
Thus, the petitioners in Traflicante, once having met the dual Data
Processing tests,61 as refined by Sierra Club v. Morton,62 were granted
standing not only to seek a remedy for their own personal injuries, but
also to protect the interests of the public .
3
At the very least, then, Trafficante held that tenants in an apart-
ment complex who claim to have suffered social and economic in-
juries caused by specific acts of discrimination to others, which are
prohibited by section 804 of the Civil Rights Act, have standing under
Section 810 to complain of such discriminatory acts. How much fur-
ther the Supreme Court will travel in applying the Traflicante rationale
remains to be seen. The existence of the "person aggrieved" provi-
sion, the inability of the Attorney General adequately to police viola-
55. 393 U.S. at 556; see J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); cf.
Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1971).
56. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201-07, 42 U.S.C. H0 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 206, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970).
59. 390 U.S. at 402.
60. Id. at 401-02.
61. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 48-59 supra.
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tions, and the existence of an opinion letter from the Assistant Re-
gional Administrator of HUD, to which the Court attached "great
weight," 64 concluding that the petitioners were persons aggrieved under
the Act, are all factors supporting the Court's holding. But one can
only speculate whether any of these factors are vital as well as sup-
portive since the opinion simply lists each without weighing them in-
dividually. Will the patron of any hotel, restaurant, or movie theater
under Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 196465 now have standing
to allege exclusion of others because of "race, color, religion or na-
tional origin," 6 simply by alleging that he is socially stigmatized by
this exclusion and by presenting a favorable agency opinion letter?
6 7
Although Trafficante might be distinguished in that tenants, once set-
tled, cannot as a practical matter as easily relocate as can the hotel,
restaurant, or theater patron, what if this is the only hotel or restaurant
in town? The 1964 Act does not make such subjective distinctions,
with the result that Trafficante would seem logically to support a grant
of standing to a "stigmatized patron." Such questions have already
been answered in the affirmative by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nities Commission in construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.68 The Commission interpreted the Act as granting standing
to white employees to allege employer discrimination against minority
job applicants, finding that "an employee's legitimate interest in the
terms and conditions of his employment comprehends his right to work
in an atmosphere free of unlawful employment practices and their con-
sequences." '69 Trafficante would seem to bear out the Commission's
interpretation.
64. 93 S. Ct. at 367; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
United States v. City of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (per curiam); Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The finding in Trafficante is an example of how loosely
"administrative construction" can be defined. The only "construction" by HUD in
this case was a bare conclusion in a letter prepared after the complaint had already
been filed in district court.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(1970). The Act contains a "person aggrieved" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3
(1970), and is sufficiently broad to make adequate enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral impossible. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (per euriam).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1970).
67. This suggests another aspect of the Trafficante holding that is implied by the
facts of the case rather than by the opinion itself: should the Trafficante rationale be
limited to allegations of racial discrimination? The broader language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), suggests not. See also Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (opinion of White, J.).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
69. Case Nos. NO 68-8-257E, NO 68-9-329E, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 79, 80 (EEOC 1969).
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CONCLUSION
While the Data Processing decision was not mentioned by the
Court in Trafficante, the dual tests there enumerated appear to be the
basis for the latter decision. The fact situation in Trafficante is yet
another area in which the Supreme Court has loosened its increasingly
flexible standing requirements by reaffirming that the nature of the in-
jury alleged is unimportant so long as it constitutes "injury in fact"
within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. In cases like
Trafficante, standing is conferred not only to remedy individual in-
juries, but perhaps more importantly, to protect the interests of society
in obtaining fair and open housing.
The practical effects of Trafficante, however, are less certain. Al-
though it expanded the class of persons entitled to allege denial of fair
housing to include tenants, whether such an expansion will significantly
increase the number of suits brought in this area is doubtful. Although
a tenant may often be in a far better position to discover discrimina-
tion,70 in the past nothing has prevented such a determined tenant
from apprising potential minority applicants of this fact and encourag-
ing action on their part. While the tenant's task was concededly greater
before Trafficante, it was usually not an impossible one, as evidenced
by the Trafficante case itself: soon after Trafficante was denied stand-
ing in the district court, five rejected minority applicants to the apart-
ment complex filed suit. 71 Furthermore, in order to establish the nec-
essary violations of section 80472 at trial, the petitioners will probably
have to call as witnesses the very persons whom the respondents claim
are the only proper parties to bring the suit-the direct victims of the
discriminatory acts. The prevention of possible harassment to civil de-
fendants by unlimited access to the federal courts seems to be one
concern implicit in recent Supreme Court considerations of the "case
70. The petitioner argued:
Unlike the individual minority applicant, who typically has only a limited
awareness of or contact with his prospective landlord, residents have a contin-
uity of association and contact which uniquely enables them to observe and
discern both the racial character of their self-contained community and the
way in which that character is maintained. This is of substantial signifi-
cance, since a large apartment complex can easily conceal its discriminatory
policies so that it is impossible for a minority applicant to determine with
any certainty that he has been the victim of racial discrimination.
Brief for Petitioner at 38, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364
(1972).
71. Burbridge v. Parkmerced Corp., No. C-71-378[AJZ] (N.D. Cal., filed Feb.
25, 1971) (filed fifteen days after the district court decision in Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ).
72. Relevant parts of § 804 are quoted note 6 supra.
1538 [Vol. 51
PRISON REFORM
or controversy" requirement in Article M of the Constitution. 73 Thus,
rather than significantly increasing the volume of litigation, Trai i-
cante's promise of merely allowing tenants to do directly what they
had previously been required to do indirectly may be one of the more
persuasive, if as yet unarticulated, factors encouraging the Court to ex-
tend the Trafficante rationale to analogous situations.
DOUGLAS K. COOPER
Constitutional Law-The Eighth Amendment
and Prison Reform
The conditions within many American prisons have made the pe-
nal system a national disgrace. From time to time crisis situations have
erupted, and the public has been made aware of the desperate need for
reform of the practices and conditions of confinement of prison inmates.
In the past several years the courts, and especially the lower federal
courts, have begun to take a more active role in ameliorating abject
prison conditions. The primary constitutional theory underlying these
suits has been the eighth amendment prohibition against the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment.' Two recent cases, Baker v.
Hamilton2 and Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 3 have em-
phasized the importance of social rehabilitation in finding the condi-
tions of juvenile confinement unlawful. These cases suggest that in the
future the eighth amendment might serve as the constitutional founda-
tion for the precept that lawful confinement of adults as well as juve-
niles requires rehabilitative services. Although this possibility seems
unlikely at the present time, the trend in the eighth amendment cases
does provide a potential avenue for courts to follow if the essential pur-
pose of the criminal justice system were to be changed from punish-
ment to reformation. This note will discuss the evolution of the eighth
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962).
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
3. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
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